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The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process
Marian Schwalm Furman*
James A. Conners, Jr.**
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor, deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
I. DUE PROCESS FOR MENTAL PATIENTS:
EVOLUTION OF A REMEDIAL CONCEPT.
The purpose of this paper is to present and describe a unique legis-
lative prescription, an untried approach to the long-standing and
vexing problem of insuring that each patient confined in a public
mental institution will be insured at least a minimum standard of
treatment. Such legislation, embodying the concept of state respon-
sibility for treatment and offering a method for assumption of that
responsibility, has been introduced in the 1969-1970 Pennsylvania
legislative session.2
Originally introduced in the 1967-68 session, primarily as a basis upon
which to have public hearings, it was known as the "Right to Treatment
Law." 3 In the hearings conducted in March 1968 before the Pennsyl-
vania Joint House and Senate Committees on Public Health and
Welfare,4 this measure's basic provisions were examined and discussed
by an array of outstanding experts in the mental health field. Con-
siderable testimony was offered at these Joint Committee hearings
on the extent and quality of institutional care of patients in Pennsyl-
vania and in the nation. These witnesses, 5 from various parts of the
J.D. Dickinson School of Law
* J.D. Dickinson School of Law
1. U.S. CONsT., Amend. XIV, § I.
2. Senate Bill 158 the "Right to Treatment Law of 1969" General Assembly of Pa.,
session of 1969, introduced by Senator Jeanette Reibman, Feb. 4, 1969, see Appendix Ex-
hibit II, P. 67.
3. Senate Bill 1274 and House Bill 2118 "The Right to Treatment Law of 1968," Gen-
eral Assembly of Pa. session of 1967, were introduced in both Houses simultaneously.
4. Hearings on S. B. 1274 and H. B. 2118, "The Right to Treatment Law of 1968" and
S. B. 1275 and H. B. 2117, "Institutional Peonage Abolishment Act," before the Joint House
and Senate Committees of the General Assembly of Pa. of Public Health and Welfare,
152nd Regular Session (1968) [hereinafter cited as Penna. Joint Hearings].
5. Arlin M. Adams, Philadelphia attorney and former Pennsylvania Secretary of Public
Welfare (1963-67); Mark David Altschule, M.D., Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine,
Medical School, Harvard University; Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, US Court of Appeals,
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country, several of national prominence and representing not only
mental health, but also law, general medicine, government, religion
and labor, uniformly deplored the pitiable, substandard levels of
care in most state institutions.
A. Tranquilizers in State Policies
It is surprising to discover that, although legal periodicals, medical
journals, statutes and court decisions have traditionally manifested
considerable concern over "due process" in the commitment of persons
to mental institutions, there has been little voiced concern until recently
on the equally important right to adequate care and treatment inside
the institution. It is incredible but true that while commitment statutes
contain provisions for judicial review before commitment or legal
remedy in case of improper commitment, 6 not one state law establishes
a judicial remedy for deprivation of treatment once a person has been
committed. Only recently have a few writings appeared that show any
concern for patients' legal rights to receive actual treatment while in-
voluntarily confined.7 This muted expression of concern is less un-
derstandable, when it is realized that all the professionals with a
working knowledge of public mental health facilities are aware that
many patients do not receive any type of treatment.
District of Columbia Circuit; Pennsylvania State Representatives Milton Berkes, James J.
A. Gallagher, and Robert Gerhart, Jr.; Morton Birnbaum, LL.B., M.D., New York; Harry
Boyer, President, Pennsylvania AFL-CIO; Gilbert Cantor, Attorney, Chairman, Mental
Health Committee, American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Philadelphia Branch; Walter
Fox, M.D., Superintendent and Area Director of Mental Health, Mental Health Institute,
Mt. Pleasant, Iowa; Donald J. Jolly, M.D., Commissioner of Mental Retardation and
Joseph Adelstein, M.D., Deputy Secretary for Mental Health, Department of Public Wel-
fare, Pennsylvania; Frederic D. Justin, President, Pennsylvania Mental Health, Inc., Phila-
delphia; George M. Leader, former Governor, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1955-59);
Jesse D. Reber, D.D., General Secretary, Pennsylvania Council of Churches; Pennsylvania
State Senator Jeanette F. Reibman; Irvin D. Rutman, Ph.D., Executive Director, Horizon
House, Inc., Philadelphia; Gloria Shipley, Senior Supervisor, Temple University Mental
Health Center and Assistant Professor of Social Work, Department of Psychiatry, School
of Medicine, Temple University; Charles F. Taylor, M.D., President, Pennsylvania Psychi-
atric Society; Francis Tyce, M.D., President, Association of Medical Supervisors of Mental
Hospitals, Rochester, Minnesota; David J. Vail, M.D., Medical Director, Department of
Public Welfare, Minnesota; Lucie S. Young, R.N., Ph.D., President, Pennsylvania Nurses
Association. Pennsylvania Joint Hearings, supra note 4.
6. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, TiE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, Tables II B
through II G, 49-72 (1961).
7. Birnbaum, Some Comments on the Right to Treatment, 13 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 34 (July, 1965); Comments, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to
Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and
Treatment: Medical Due Process, 15 DEPAUL L. Rv. 291 (1966); Ross, Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicH. L. REV. 945 (1959). See also Dr.
Birnbaum's testimony at Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, Part I Civil Aspects at 273-305.
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Involuntary mental institution confinement is amenable to con-
stitutional due process considerations, in that it constitutes imprison-
ment or deprivation of liberty.8 Both persons involuntary committed
and persons voluntary committed who are subsequently restrained from
leaving the institution come directly within the ambit of the 14th
amendment to the Federal Constitution:
- . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 9
Popular reaction to mental hospitalization as "imprisonment" may
be somewhat mitigated, because this confinement is not considered
punishment since it is intended for the disabled person's treatment as
well as for the protection of himself and others. As long as the decision
to confine (hospitalize) is made, not by the disabled person, but by
others, however, it is a deprivation of liberty and is as entitled to
judicially enforced safeguards as is confinement in prison.10
Although the commitment usually occurs through the initiative of a
private party, the proceeding is a public one. It is a state process; the
police power of the state is invoked to accomplish the restraint of
liberty." There are generally two statutory conditions under which a
mentally ill person may be confined in a public mental institution
against his will: if restraint is necessary to prevent the allegedly men-
tally disabled person from inflicting harm on himself or others and if
confinement is necessary for, or will be conducive to, his restoration
to health.
Most state laws authorizing involuntary confinement use both bases,
either conjunctively or in the alternative.12 The "need for treatment"
8. For discussion of the historical development of constitutional due process concepts
and their application to institutionalization of the mentally ill, see Kittrie, Compulsor%
Mental Treatment and the Requirements of Due Process, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 28 (1960).
9. See discussion by Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 308-311.
10. Hinchman v. Richie, I Brightly 143 (Penna. 1849); Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law
Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845).
11. See Kittrie, supra note 8, at 32-33 for discussion of the three bases of the state's
authority to confine mentally ill persons without'their consent: the police power, the
sovereign's position as parens patriae, and the authority and duty to provide for the
indigent.
12. A 1959 survey of state commitment procedures indicated that 43 states and the
District of Columbia had statutes authorizing involuntary hospitalized custody of the
mentally ill. Forty of these laws, including the District of Columbia, delineated the pro-
tective and treatment bases underlying that judicially imposed commitment. Thirty of
these statutes used the two bases mentioned above. In five states the sole test was whether
the person was dangerous to himself or others, and need for proper care or treatment was
the only criterion in five others. A half dozen other state laws failed to establish such a
Vol. 8: 32, 1969-1970
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basis could be said to encompass the "danger to himself or others" basis,
since anyone so disabled is obviously in need of treatment. Even those
states whose commitment statutes do not include a need for treatment
basis do in fact commit and hold many persons on this theory, since
most patients are not dangerous. 13
Regardless of the enumerated statutory justifications for the exercise
of the state's police power to forceably confine persons in mental institu-
tions, the fundamental concepts on which the constitutional due pro-
cess requirements of the 14th Amendment are based would seem to
dictate that the state is obligated to furnish adequate treatment to per-
sons so confined. Only insensitivity to the most elementary concepts
of justice could explain the failure of the state to assume the legal
obligation to provide such treatment; and most of them at least ex-
press this purpose or intent, if not the obligation, through their com-
mitment statutes.
That the obligation to provide treatment, as distinguished from
mere custodial care, is legally assumed, once the state restrains a per-
son against his will in a mental institution, is often recognized. The
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 196614
provides that if a person is believed to be mentally disabled and,
after petition to the court and examination, is found to be in need of
institutional care, the court may order the commitment of such per-
criterion, presumably leaving the courts to determine who should be hospitalized. In the
balance of the states the courts were substituted by administrators or physicians who enter
into the commitment process through the statutory standards already mentioned. See
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945,
Table I, at 1008-1011 (1959).
13. Albert Deutsch, author of THE SHAME OF THE STATES and THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA, former welfare research associate with the New York Department of Social
Welfare, and journalist specializing in social welfare problems, testified in the 1961 Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee hearings, supra note 7, at 46:
... I am not advocating that all the so-called insane be loosed on the community,
but I am convinced that all but a small proportion of the civil insane need not be
subjected to degrading commitment proceedings and then locked up in custodial
institutions. We can no longer tolerate the paradox of depriving mental patients of
their civil rights in the name of hospital treatment when we know that it is not only
unnecessary for security but harmful to potential recovery.
At the same hearings Dr. Szasz, professor of psychiatry at the Upstate Medical Center,
Syracuse, N.Y., testified, at 271:
By empirical definitions of mental illness I mean such things as for example defining
those inside of mental hospitals as mentally ill, and those outside as not; or those
who go to psychiatrists for help as mentally ill, and those who do not as not ill. These
may not be good definitions, but if we insist on talking about mental illness, we have
got to have some measures for defining it. Now, if we define mental illness in some
such ways as these, then I say there is not a shred of evidence that the mentally ill
are more dangerous than the mentally healthy.
14. 1966 Spec. Sess., No. 3, Oct. 20, P.L. 6, Art. IV, Sec. 406; 50 P.S. 4406.
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son for care and treatment.15 Thus, care and treatment are assumed
to be inseparable.
Statutory expressions of this kind scattered throughout earlier
Pennsylvania mental health legislation are apparently in conformity
with early judicial expressions of the required bases for forcible restraint
in mental institutions. In an interesting mid-19th century Pennsylvania
case, which was treated by the court as a case of first impression in that
state, the court in referring to the propriety of forcible mental institu-
tion confinement said:
If wrong has been done, they [mental institutions] are open to the
examination of the civil courts, and the question will be, in each
particular case, whether the safety of the person himself, or that of
his family or friends or neighbors, required that he should be
restrained for a time, and whether restraint is necessary for his
restoration or will be conducive thereto. . . and if confinement or
restraint, with regular medical treatment, are necessary for the
restoration of such a person to a perfectly sound mind, they are the
best friends of the person who enforce it.6 [Emphasis added.]
Treatment of the mentally disabled has thus been recognized as a
basic governmental responsibility for over a century.17
15. See, however, Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Disabled in Pnnsylvania:
The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 71 DieK. L. REv., 300 (1967), at
345-348. The author states that this act was drafted with the conscious intent not to
provide a guarantee of active treatment for patients, and to this end the words care
or treatment were deliberately used throughout the act. In spite of this apparent intent,
the statute does include the cited provision, which grants judicial authority to order con-
finement for treatment as well as care.
16. Hinchman v. Richie, 1 Brightly 143 (Penna. 1849).
17. The Pennsylvania Hospital was established in 1756 as the first general hospital in
the US. also receiving mental patients. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA, 117.
(1949).
Dr. F. Lewis Bartlett, psychiatrist at Haverford State Hospital, Haverford, Pennsylvania,
in a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association,
Atlantic City, N.J., May 12, 1966, pointed to the increasing trend among the states to
relax licensure requirements for state hospital staff employment. He listed four states
that had lowered their requirements in the immediately preceding year (Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Oklahoma and Washington).
Ironically, while state standards are being lowered, non-state revenue sources of support
for mental hospital care have been increasing significantly. Federal medicare and VA
payments, private medical insurance payments, other benefits to which patients are en-
titled, such as retirement and disability pensions and family resources subject to liability
for care have increased significantly. Michael Johnson, Vice President of the Pennsylvania
AFL-CIO, testified before Pennsylvania Joint Hearings, supra note 4, at 282 that
during the past five years alone and particularly in the past three years, the increase
in revenue through these various sources has tripled and quadrupled. . . . I would
like to point out to you, Senator, that when you increase this revenue without in-
creasing the expenditure for which there has been demonstrated such a great need
as in the testimony today, we are in effect reducing the state's responsibility which
admittedly is low enough as it stands,
Between 1960 and 1965, the number of public mental hospital physicians per resident
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Inexplicably, although government provision of medical treatment
apparently has been rather consistently assumed (both statutorily and
judicially) to be legally inseparable from confinement and care, until
recently the patient's statutory right to legal redress against the state
where involuntary confinement is not in fact accompanied by treat-
ment has not been recognized. There is one recent exception.', The
explanation may lie in a depressing factual situation that is common to
most of the states-a case of de facto and de jure being so far apart
that for de jure to take cognizance of de facto could cause govern-
mental, indeed political, reverberations of unpredictable dimensions.
Judicial remedy is available to test the propriety of commitment
in contrast to the absence of such judicial remedy for lack of treat-
ment.19 Although the statutory provisions governing petitions for writ of
habeas corpus in these cases are not completely satisfactory, 20 the right
to redress is at least recognized. If the need for treatment has generally
been assumed as a prerequisite condition of the right to commit and if
the furnishing of such treatment is directed by legislation, why, then,
has there been no legal remedy available to the person restrained
but not treated?
It is submitted that the answer lies in the almost universal failure
of public mental institutions to provide even minimum standards of
treatment.21 The responsibility for this dereliction lies, however, not
state mental institution patients dropped 306%. FIFTEEN INDICES, infra. note 64, at 11.
18. The District of Columbia 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, D.C. Code
§§ 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966), affirmatively provides that every public mental hospital patient
shall be entitled to psychiatric and medical treatment. It does not expressly provide for
judicial remedy.
19. In many states there are rather formal hearing requirements, including in some
the right to demand a jury trial, as part of the pre-commitment proceedings. About 15
states do not provide for patient right to pre-commitment hearing, but these grant habeas
corpus or other post-commitment remedies to review the propriety of commitment.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, The Mentally Disabled and the Law, supra note 6.
20. See Comment, supra note 15, at 339-343, for instance, on the problems associated
with the various Pennsylvania habeas corpus statutes.
21. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 298, alleges, "We are satisfied with segregating and
literally 'parking away' thousands of mental patients with no more than tranquilizers."
He quotes Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry, Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 NEV.
L. REV. 30, 22 (1962);
According to a recent survey, eighty per cent of mental institutions are purely cus-
todial, providing no treatment of any significance even to their law-abiding patients.
A good portion of the remaining twenty per cent provide adequate treatment only
for well-paying private patients.
Deutsch, in his testimony before the 1961 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on The
Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, supra note 13, at 43:
That is, we send them to these institutions without their approval or against their
will. We do so on the implicit or explicit premise or. promise that they will be
treated with a view toward aiding their recovery. But what happens?
Recent studies-notably those of Drs. Erving Goffman, William Caudill, and Ivan
Belknap, based on prolonged ward observation-attest to the continuance of the
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with the hospitals' medical staffs, but with the state legislatures and
administrations who lack the moral courage to invest sufficient public
funds for the staffing needed to furnish even minimal treatment
standards.
B. Judicial Evolution
Before the courts mental patients deprived of treatment have
historically been in a position comparable to victims of non-profit
general hospital negligence and victims of police brutality. The chari-
table immunity and sovereign immunity doctrines, which have de-
prived these victims of remedy, have outlasted their utility in many
jurisdictions primarily because the courts have viewed these issues as
more properly within the jurisdiction of legislative forums. Jurists,
with their ingrained sense of obedience to stare decisis, find it difficult
to rationalize the abolition of these doctrines even when they fully
recognize the injustice of continuing the doctrines.
The justiciable right to public institutional treatment suffers an
additional impediment, however, that deserves sympathetic considera-
tion. That is the practical difficulty of judicially ascertaining what con-
stitutes "adequate treatment" as related to each case and of effectuating
enforcement of an order to furnish such treatment.22
In spite of these impediments, courts in a few jurisdictions have
begun to recognize the right to treatment as a justiciable one, 23 and a
variety of remedies have been granted. These decisions follow a grow-
ing body of cases which have developed the fairly well defined principle
that in order for involuntary confinement statutes to be classified as
nonpenal, thereby avoiding the constitutional requirements surround-
ing criminal proceedings, 24 they must base the state's mental institution
stripping of the patient, loss of his individuality, and dignity, depersonalization, and
demoralization. The chronically acute shortage of physicians in most wards makes
the term 'psychotherapy' a hideous mockery for most patients. In most public mental
hospitals, the average ward patient comes into person-to-person contact with a physi-
cian about 15 minutes every month-not a day or even a week, but a month ....
22. See Comment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, op. cit., 104-114 for discussion of some of the
difficulties encountered when the task of fixing and measuring required medical treat-
ment standards is foisted on the courts.
23. Whitree v. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Nason v. Supt. of Bridgewater State Hospital, 339 Mass. 313, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Page, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. 1966);
Anderson v. State, 48 Misc. 2d 1061, 266 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
24. The 6th, 8th and 13th Amendments to the Federal Constitution are generally con-
sidered applicable, referring to rights of accused in criminal prosecutions, prohibition of
cruel -and excessive punishments, and prohibition against involuntary servitude except
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, respectively.
Vol. 8: 32, 1969-1970
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commitment authority on the remedial purpose of treatment.25 Some of
these cases hold further that unless confinement pursuant to these
statutes is in fact accompanied by treatment the statutes still run into
the constitutional roadblocks, in their application. 2 Under these hold-
ings, only if the state's confinement procedures meet both tests (statutory
expression of remedial purpose and actual provision of treatment) can
they be classed as civil commitments. Even when the commitments are
classed as civil, the continued confinement is subject to review for 14th
amendment due process and equal protection requirements vis-a-vis
adequate treatment. 27
In reviewing the cases it becomes apparent that judicial recognition
of public mental institution patients' legal rights to adequate treatment
does not dispose of the problem. Once the right is established, what
remedies should be recognized as appropriate? Money damages, man-
damus, mandatory injunction, habeas corpus? 28 Each of these carries
practical limitations that need to be recognized. Examining the limita-
tions prepares a basis for developing workable legal procedures that
are adaptable to the different situations presented in individual cases.
In May of 1968 the Court of Claims of the State of New York awarded
a former Matteawan State Hospital inmate, Victor Whitree, $300,000
in damages, the exclusive legal basis being that he was deprived of
adequate treatment during his 14 years' confinement.2 9 One of the
elements of damages was false imprisonment for over 12 of those years.
25. One of the earliest cases to condition the propriety of forceable confinement of
mentally disabled persons on the remedial purpose of the confinement was the Pennsyl-
vania case of Hinchman v. Richie, I Brightly 143 (1849). Cf. Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8
Law Rep. 122 (1845 Mass.). Contemporary cases include Sas v. State of Maryland, 334
F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. 1953).
26. Sas v. State of Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Whitree v. State of New
York, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Nason v. Supt. of Bridgewater State
Hospital, 339 Mass. 313, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
27. Darnell v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64, at 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Nason v. Supt. of Bridge-
water State Hospital, 339 Mass. 313 at 317, 233 N.E.2d 908 at 913:
Confinement of mentally ill persons, not found guilty of crime, without affording them
reasonable treatment also raises serious questions of deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. As we said in the Page case, 339 Mass. 313, 317, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85,
of a statute permitting comparable confinement, "to be sustained as a nonpenal
statute . . . it is necessary that the remedial aspect of confinement . . . have founda-
tion in fact."
28. The legal propriety, as distinguished from the practical utility, of these remedies
was touched on by the court in Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 at 420 (1953):
We think that the doctrine of the Bonner case applies to our present problem. Appel-
lant's complaint did not arise until after his commitment and so was not available
to him upon an appeal from the order of commitment. Mandamus or injunction
might also lie, but they would not preclude habeas corpus where illegal detention
is involved.
29. Whitree v. State of New York, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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The testimony established that, had he received psychiatric treatment,
he could have been discharged after two years. The failure to provide
treatment cost the state not only the 12 years of unnecessary custodial
care but (unless the decision is successfully appealed) $300,000 in
damages plus the cost of litigation extending over many years.
It does not require any precise mathematical computations to realize
that these huge sums could have paid for substantial psychiatric services
for many patients.30
Just three months before the Whitree decision was issued, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, recognized the legal grounds of a
habeas corpus petition brought by an inmate of Bridgewater State
Hospital who alleged that he was receiving inadequate treatment and
was therefore being deprived of the equal protection of the laws and
of due process. 31 The court further found that the petitioner had
failed to receive adequate treatment during his six years of con-
finement. Since the petitioner was considered extremely dangerous,
the court undoubtedly had difficulty selecting an appropriate remedy.
It therefore held that if adequate treatment was not provided the peti-
tioner within a reasonable time, the legality of his further confinement
could be presented to the county court for review. The court's frustra-
tion over the irreconcilable factors was apparent-unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty versus the absolute need to continue that con-
finement, the latter probably due to the failure of the "parens patriae"
to carry out the purpose for which petitioner was committed.
Two earlier Massachusetts cases, decided less than a year apart, in
June 1959 and March 1960, respectively, are interesting as illustrations
of the salutory effect courts can have on laggard institutions. In the first
case32 an inmate of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Con-
cord was in the process of being transferred to the treatment center of
that institution for an indefinite period after his sentence as a sex
offender had expired. The defendant excepted to the commitment pro-
ceedings, claiming that the treatment center was no treatment center
in fact; that it was substantially indistinguishable from the remainder
30. Money damages "after the fact" does not, of course, help the mentally disabled
person to obtain necessary treatment. Further, it is not likely that medical testimony will
often be available as to how much the hospitalization time could have been shortened
had psychiatric treatment been available.
31. Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 339 Mass. 313, 233 N.E.2d
908 (1968).
32. Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959).
Vol. 8: 32, 1969-1970
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of the correctional institution, and that, since this was so, the commit-
ment statute as applied was unconstitutional and inoperative.
The appellate court, reversing the lower court, upheld the peti-
tioner's exceptions. It found that the center as constituted had prac-
tically no indicia of being a bona fide treatment center. It said:
... to be sustained as a nonpenal statute, in its application to the
defendant, it is necessary that the remedial aspect of confinement
thereunder have foundation in fact. It is not sufficient that the
Legislature announce a remedial purpose if the consequences to
the individual are penal." [Emphasis added.]33
The court held that the commitment was invalid and that even if the
treatment center had been properly constituted after his commitment,
it would not have validated the commitment retroactively.
In a subsequent March 1960 case reviewed by the same court,34 it
was revealed that within three weeks and four days after the earlier
decision, the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health had estab-
lished a true treatment center at the correctional institution. In dis-
missing this petitioner's appeal, the court noted that the center had
acquired general medical and psychiatric staff; had arrangements with
a nearby hospital for staff consultation; was now separated from the
general prison sections of the institution; in other words, it had
acquired the attributes of a true treatment center, all within less than
a month after the court's earlier decision.
The speedy response of that state's Department of Mental Health to
the appellate court's refusal to uphold confinement under the prevail-
ing conditions suggests that much of the universal administrative
handwringing over inability to acquire adequate staff is somewhat
exaggerated. Undoubtedly, there are not nearly enough psychiatric
treatment personnel to give adequate attention to all the mentally
disabled. A more pertinent observation, however, is that there are
many psychiatrists who are not tempted to substitute time in dreary,
uninspiring public institutions for even part of their private office
practices, often composed of many affluent neurotics whose need for
treatment is not serious.8 5 The psychiatrists cannot be blamed too
33. Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313 at 315, 159 N.E.2d 82 at 85.
34. Commonwealth v. Hogan, 341 Mass. 372 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960).
35. Typical is the Pennsylvania situation. According to the 1968 edition of FI=TrEN
INDICES, published by the Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion and the National Association for Mental Health, Pennsylvania in 1965 ranked l1th
in the nation in ratio of psychiatrists to general population. It ranked only 45th, however,
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much, when the administrative atmosphere is one of resignation, instead
of militant determination to at least approach acceptable standards of
treatment.
Probably the most frequently cited case on the right to treatment is
the District of Columbia U.S. District Court of Appeal's Rouse v.
Cameron decision of 1966.36 A St. Elizabeths Hospital patient, con-
fined since 1962, attacked the legality of his confinement, asserting,
among other things, that the hospital failed to provide adequate treat-
ment. The trial judge, in denying the petition, had stated: "My juris-
diction is limited to determining whether he has recovered his sanity.
I don't think I have a right to consider whether he is getting enough
treatment."3 7 On appeal, he was reversed.
Chief Judge Bazelon, reversing the District Court, noted that
although many states include in their mental health statutes expressions
of state obligation to provide care and treatment to persons confined
in their mental institutions, 38 none provide the patient with a judicial
remedy. Congress in 1964 passed legislation for the District of Colum-
bia which expressly granted a legal right to every public mental
hospital patient to receive adequate treatment.3 9 The statute further
required the maintenance of hospital records detailing psychiatric
treatment and the furnishing of these records, upon the patient's
request, to his attorney or personal physician, thus affording the pos-
sibility of judicial remedy. 40
in ratio of physicians, serving full-time in public mental institutions, to patient population.
To make matters worse, practically none of the serving physicians were licensed psy-
chiatrists.
Dr. Bartlett, in his article, Present-Day Requirements for State Hospitals Joining the
Community (infra note 73) said:
Although staffing state hospitals with qualified physicians has always been declared
impossible the fact remains that the proposition has never been tested.
Today [1966] when membership in the American Psychiatric Association exceeds
15,000 there are fewer members working full time in state institutions than when
the membership was 4,000. The reasons for this are readily apparent: since World
War II, psychiatric leadership has made the attractions of practice, largely with
self-designated patients, more rewarding than the professional treatment of the
severely ill; and, conversely, practice in a state hospital is less rewarding, for a doctor's
position is socially and professional denigrated by low professional standards and by
appropriately low pay scales. Furthermore, hospital professional procedures are dic-
tated by anachronistic policies necessitated by traditional staffing deficiencies. Gresh-
ham's Law applies: poor doctors and poor procedures drive out good doctors and good
procedures.
36. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. 1966).
37. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 at 452.
38. Id. at 455.
39. The 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, D. C. CODE SEc. 21-562 (Supp.
V. 1966).
40. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 at 454.
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Judge Bazelon referred to some of the background of the 1964
statute. Congress had considered a draft act prepared by the National
Institute of Mental Health which contained the following provision:
"Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment and, to
the extent that facilities, equipment and personnel are available, to
medical care and treatment in accordance with the highest standards
accepted in medical practice. ' 4 1 [Emphasis original.] Since the italicized
language was omitted in the act as passed, Judge Bazelon held, on the
basis of this admission, that continued failure to provide treatment
could not be justified by lack of staff or facilities. 42
The constitutional issues presented by involuntary, indefinite con-
finement including those of due process, equal protection, and
cruel and unusual punishment, were also discussed. The presence of the
D.C. Statute made resolution of the Constitutional issues unnecessary
in order to determine the legality of confinement without treatment.
Judge Bazelon also touched on some of the problems connected with
judicial determination of adequacy of treatment. Referring to the
uncertainty of the present state of knowledge and therapy, he noted
that lack of finality cannot relieve the court of its duty to render an
informed decision. 43 He also mentions in a footnote44 the desirability
of administrative review procedures, noting that these would not only
permit remedy by the hospital, but would also provide a record which
might assist in the disposition of any resulting litigation.
The direction of the preceding cases should be a signal to state
legislatures that sooner or later the right of every public mental institu-
tion inmate to adequate treatment may be expressly placed within the
14th amendment due process and equal protection requirements by
the highest courts of the state or even the U.S. Supreme Court. The
result could be temporary chaos, panic and astronomic state expense.
The staggering liability that could ensue from damage suits alone is
most sobering.
41. Id. at 457.
42. At least ten states have adopted portions of the NIMH Draft Act, including the
quoted provision, above, conditioning patients' entitlement to humane care and treat-
ment and personnel. This expression of good intent begs the issue, and foreseeably, has
not been effective to guarantee treatment rights. The major obstacle is, of course, lack of
availability of facilities, equipment - and most of all, personnel. Until state administra-
tions are required to furnish them, all too many patients will continue to deteriorate and
die in the public mental institutions.
43. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 at 457.
44. Id. at 456. See fn. 22.
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Effective legislative action will not be cheap.4 5 Just as a run-down,
neglected home costs much more to bring into a satisfactory standard
of repair, so too the years of deterioration in the treatment standards of
most mental institutions will necessitate extra investment. Carefully
devised legislative prescriptions (together with necessary appropriations,
of course) can effect the transition to maintenance of decent treatment
standards on a planned and orderly basis, through coordination among
legislative, administrative and judicial forums.
II. THE AILMENT: A CHRONIC, ENDEMIC, AND CRITICAL PROBLEM
In June 1966 the Pennsylvania House of Representatives directed,
by formal resolution,46 that a bipartisan House Committee visit all the
state mental hospitals and schools for the mentally retarded, after
earlier investigations by a small bipartisan group of legislators had
turned up disquieting conditions at several institutions. The Com-
mittee was charged with submitting a report to the House of its
findings and recommendations.
After personal visitations to all 29 state hospitals and schools, the
Committee issued a formal report in 1967. 4 7 It included in its findings
the following serious problems: overcrowding, obsolete facilities, lack
of trained personnel, high turnover of help due to poor pay, frustrating
business red tape and failure to provide the best therapeutic treatment.
The Committee members all concurred that the single most significant
contribution of the visitations was the awareness it brought the law-
makers. They saw for themselves what leaders in the mental health
field have been alleging with great concern: that public mental hospitals
are largely custodial warehouses for human beings.
The Honorable George M. Leader, former Governor of Pennsyl-
vania (1955-59), who was associated with advances in the mental health
field during his tenure, reviewed in his testimony before the Com-
mittee a list of indices of care and treatment levels, pointing out Penn-
sylvania's low ranking in most indices.48
45. Dr. Adelstein, Deputy Secretary for Mental Health, Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare, stated in the Penna. Joint Hearings (supra note 4, at 120) that the cost
of bringing staffing levels up to the American Psychiatric Association standards would cost
$25,825,374 for fiscal 1968-69. He stated that this expenditure would be offset by reducing
the length of stay of patients.
46. H.R. 82, General Assembly, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, adopted June 15, 1966.
47. SPECIAL HOUSE COMMITrEE REPORT ON RESOLUTION No. 82, Id.
48. Penna. Joint Hearings, supra note 4, at 79, 80.
In considering the number of resident patients, on an average, per 100,000 civilian
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However narrowly the basic public welfare responsibility of govern-
ment is construed, it is scarcely open to question that mentally disabled
persons confined in public institutions are about the most vulnerable
of any class that is dependent on the proper execution of that public
welfare responsibility.
Historically, superstitions and ignorance about the nature and origins
of mental disability; the lack of adequate facilities within which to
hospitalize the mentally ill; failure of medical science until recently
to render mental disability amenable to treatment on any consistent,
predictable basis; 49 and limited recognition that provision of medical
care to the medically indigent is a basic public welfare responsibility
have served to allow the public conscience to remain dormant. Con-
sequently, public mental institution patients' legal remedies for lack
of treatment, as distinguished from the obligation it is generally assumed
the state accepts to provide treatment, have been never statutorily de-
fined nor seldom judicially enforced. These past deterrents can no
longer justifiably be proffered as excuse for continued dereliction.
A. Hospitalization Minus Treatment Equals Death Trap
At the close of 1966, there were 1,229,06850 mental patients in state,
federal and county mental hospitals and clinics and over 30,00051 in
private and general hospitals and institutions. Mental patients alone
population, in 1956, we ranked llth, and in 1966, we ranked 7th. This does not mean
that we now have more patients per 100,000 citizens. This means that we have not
reduced our resident patient population as quickly as have other states. In 1956,
Pennsylvania was spending $3.06 per resident patient in our hospitals. Our rank was
29th. In 1966 we were spending for the same maintenance per patient, $7.01, and
our rank was 35th. . . . In 1956, Pennsylvania ranked 32nd in terms of ratio of
full-time doctors to resident patients. In 1966 that ranking was 45th .... In 1956, in
terms of the ratio of full-time employes to resident patients, Pennsylvania's rank
among the states was 21st. In 1966, our rank was 36th.
49. "Though human mental illness is ages old virtually everything known today
about its physical treatment has been learned in the last twenty years." Martin, "Inside
the Asylum," SAT. EVE. POST, Nov. 10, 1956, at 130.
50. This figure includes 452,329 resident patients and 450,020 in out-patient clinics
of state and municipal hospitals; 62,000 resident patients and 73,922 in outpatient clinics
of Veterans Administration hospitals; 190,797 in public institutions for the mentally re-
tarded. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, Current Facility Reports (1967), PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE DATA, STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL HosPITALs, UNrrED STATES, Series MHB-H-11,
at 7; PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVEMENT DATA, OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS, UNITED
STATES, Series MHB-J-l, at 8, 10; PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DATA, PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED, UNITED STATES, Series MHB-l-11,
at 7.
51. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, (1968), PATIENTS IN MENTAL HOSPITALS, OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS,
AND INSTITUTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED, Table No. 98; ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES
OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND MENTALLY RETARDED, Table No. 99, at 74.
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occupy 45.6%52 of all hospital beds reported in the United States.
Monopolistically, the responsibility for providing psychiatric care and
facilities resides with the states, which provide for 87% 5 of all mental
patients in 24554 state hospitals.
It is axiomatic that the longer mental illness is prolonged by lack of
care, the more public revenue is expended and the more lives are
wasted. States' mental health programs constitute one of the "big four'
in proportion to the total state expenditures, following education, high-
ways, and public welfare. 55 The total expenditures of state and county
governments constitute over one billion dollars annually for capital
and operating costs of mental hospitals. 56 The annual wage loss attrib-
uted to these mental patients could well be estimated over $2 billion.57
What are the chances of discharge for a patient from a public mental
institution?58 An even more sobering question is-what are your
chances of remaining alive, if you should become mentally ill and be
committed to a mental institution because this is "necessary" for your
care and treatment? Data published by the National Institute of Mental
Health reveal the shocking disparity between public mental institu-
tion death rates and general population death rates.59 If you were lucky
enough to be hospitalized in Hawaii, where there were only 778 patients
confined in public mental institutions in 1966, you would have had a
better chance of survival than if you had been free to enjoy surfing or
touring volcanoes. 60 If, on the other hand, you became mentally dis-
abled and were confined in a Pennsylvania public mental institution
in 1966, your chances of becoming a death statistic were at least seven
52. In 1965, there were approximately 767,024 mental patients in federal, state, county,
private and general hospitals and a total availability of 1,678,658 beds in all hospitals
in the United States. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, Social Security Bulletin, (Jan. 1967).
53. Approximately 7.1% are in Veterans Administration hospitals; 3.3% in county
and municipal hospitals; 2.6% in private hospitals. supra notes 50, 51.
54. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT.
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 1965, PART II STATE
AND COUNTY MENTAL HOSPITALS, Number of State and County Mental Hospitals in 1965,
Table A, at 9. In 1965 there were county hospitals distributed as follows: Maryland 1,
New Jersey 6, Tennessee 1, Wisconsin 37.
55. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1968), REVENUE, DEBT, AND EXPENDITURES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS BY STATES FOR
1967, Table No. 596, at 421.
56. Supra note 54, Table No. 10, at 53.
57. In 1965, there were 767,024 hospitalized mental patients in all hospitals. Supra
note 52. In 1965, the per capita personal income of all individuals in the United States
was $2,760. Supra note 55, Table 468, at 322.
58. See Appendix Exhibit I.
59. Exhibit I, Ibid.
60. Exhibit I, Ibid.
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times higher than if you had not been so confined. Even worse ratios
obtain in many states. 6x
The incredibly high mental institution resident death rates bear
evidence that such confinement represents a high likelihood of depriva-
tion of life as well as liberty. 62 There has been created in many states a
situation where the processes of law and the direct powers of the state
are invoked ostensibly for the welfare of the helpless, but in fact they
result in increased chances of death for the recipients.
The precise reasons for the startlingly higher death rates in public
mental institutions are not known with certainty.63 Statistics obtained
from the measured indices of care and treatment lead to conclusions,
however, that are difficult to ignore.64 Sample: in 1965 while Penn-
sylvania ranked 8th in the nation in ratio of psychiatrists to general
population, it ranked 45th in the ratio of doctors to patients in public
mental institutions, not quite 6 doctors for each 1,000 patients.6 5 Not
too surprisingly, Pennsylvania ranked 50th in ratio of patients dis-
charged (alive) to average patient population.66 It may come as a shock
to some unfamiliar with public mental institution staffing deficiencies
to learn that the staffs of several of Pennsylvania's larger institutions
have included not one licensed phychiatrist, and only very few have
even one resident psychiatrist. 67
61. Exhibit I, Ibid.
62. Dr. Fox, testified before the Pennsylvania Joint Hearings, supra note 4, at 54-55
that mental hospitalization increases chances of death, that a random patient in a given
age group in a mental hospital has a much greater chance of dying than his brother in
the home, office, and on the highways.
The high death rate in hospitals as compared to the general population is alarming
when it is coupled with the knowledge that 'mental illnesses are chronic illnesses
for the most part, but they seldom kill.' 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 512, note 7, at
513 (1951).
63. Dr. Fox, supra note 63, at 55.
64. THE JOINT INFORMATION SERVIcE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION AND
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH, FIFTEEN INDICES, REVIEWING STATE AND
LOCAL MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS (1968 ed.).
65. Ibid. Table 6, "Number of Psychiatrists per 100,000 Population," at 19 and Table
2, "Number of Resident Patients per Public Mental Hospital Physician," at 11.
66. See Exhibit 1, "Net Releases From Hospital Per Year 1000 Average Resident
Patients." Pennsylvania with 228.5 per 1000 average resident patients ranks the lowest of
all the states in the number of releases, as can be observed from comparing all other
states in the column. The ranking may be distorted by the different methods used among
the states for handling and reporting releases. Pennsylvania does not usually "discharge"
patients at the time of their release, but furloughs them for a certain period of time, and
only "discharges" after a successful interim furlough. Therefore, a furloughed, later
readmitted, still later discharged patient would be counted as one "release," whereas in
many states this would be counted as two separate releases.
67. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Office of Planning and Research
Document O.M.H. 4.5, released Oct. 31, 1967, covering June 30, 1966, to June 30, 1967.
Comment, supra note 15, at 334-335, n. 174, reports that as of June 30, 1966, there
were only 180 full-time equivalent psychiatrists employed in Pennsylvania's 18 State mental
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Public mental health administrators acknowledge that many, many
chronic patients are not seen by a general medical practitioner for
years on end.68 Since the mentally ill are not very articulate in com-
municating medical complaints, the lack of periodic consultation and
examination undoubtedly contributes significantly to the inordinately
high death rates.
B. "Parens Patriae"-Humane Care or Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
Ordinarily, an otherwise normal person with a respiratory disease or
bone fracture has the availability of a hospital and the ministrations of
a physician and can not only reasonably be assured his ailment is being
treated, but is able to determine that he is receiving proper treatment.
Similarly, a paretic or paranoid in open society has access to medical
facilities and professional resources for treatment. He may not be able
to ascertain that he is receiving proper care, but neither are persons
with cancer or heart disease who do not possess sufficient knowledge
of their illness to know what type of medical care is best for them. In
the latter instance their ignorance is not due to their illness. However,
in both cases it is likely that someone can be present to see that the care
and treatment accorded is conducive to their recovery.
Consequently, a generally overlooked component of the deprivation
of liberty, and sometimes life, suffered by the patient confined in the
state mental institution, is that he is removed from the possibility of
obtaining even that amount of medical treatment which he could have
received, and probably would receive, were he outside the institution.
He is deprived not only of an ideal or average standard of care, for
which the exact degree of public responsibility may be susceptible to
somewhat variable determinations, but he is actively deprived by State-
institutions; that 31 of these were administrators (superintendents or assistant superin-
tendents) and 43 of them were psychiatric residents who spend much of their time in
training rather than in patient care; thus leaving only 106 psychiatrists actually engaged
in the care of an average daily patient population of 34,920, or a ratio of 1 psychiatrist
for each 30 patients.
68. Rep. Kaufman, member of the Pennsylvania House Committee on Public Health
and Welfare, commented during the Joint Committee hearings, supra note 4 at 125:
Now I have been in some state institutions where the superintendent admits to me
that there are patients in back wards that haven't been seen by a physician in maybe
five years.
Senator Reibman, who testified before the Penna. Joint Hearings, in presenting some detail
on lack of staff, commented:
I know of some instances of doctors being assigned to the psychiatric care of as many
as 800 or 400 patients and in some instances as many as 500 or more .... As a prac-
tical matter, many patients are never even seen by a doctor at all.
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imposed confinement of the actual care he could get in his own com-
munity. This amounts to a quarantine, not for public protection (if
he is not dangerous and is not afflicted with a contagious disease) but
from available treatment.
Clinics, hospital outpatient departments, and counseling services
are increasingly available to indigent and low-income persons as well
as to those able to pay, and rural family physicians are noted for dis-
pensing medical services by way of their own private charity. Public
assistance recipients in most states are legally entitled to medical serv-
ices. Pennsylvania recipients living in their own homes, unlike those
patients in mental institutions, are entitled to regular visits to the
doctor of their choice for chronic ailments and to as many visits as are
necessary in any given period of time for acute illnesses. 9 Any prescribed
medications, except possibly the most esoteric, are paid by the state.
Many mentally disabled persons, a good number of them receiving
public assistance, live in their own communities and manage to func-
tion adequately, with some personal supportive help. Relatives or
friends check in on them occasionally, take them to the doctor, if
necessary, or help them with perplexing business matters. Their
general medical care, with counseling added in some cases, allows
them to manage satisfactorily. In most cases the factor governing
whether or not a mentally disabled person will be confined in an
institution is the presence or absence of minimum supportive services
from friends or relatives. In respect to medical treatment, the person
"humanely" confined against his will in the mental "hospital" fares
much worse than his counterpart who is left to his own devices in the
community.
Since most mental institution patients are neither dangerous to others
nor even dangerous to themselves in a direct or immediate sense, the
avowed official purpose of their commitment is to provide necessary
care (room and board plus supportive personal care) and treatment
which presumably they are unable to obtain for themselves. The in-
voluntary commitment procedure and enforced hospitalization are
sanctioned by statutory authority and public approval, because they
appear to be humane and pursuant to governmental duty to provide
for the welfare of the helpless.
69. Pennsylvania's public assistance law has included the right to payment for medical
care for assistance recipients since 1939. Act of June 24, 1937. P.L. 2051, as amended by
Act of Sept. 14, 1938, P.L. 31, No. 10.
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Whether we respond more readily to the personal testimony of
mental health personnel who report their own bleak observations 0 or
the more dispassionately presented data from reported indices of treat-
ment standards, 71 the verdict is the same-confinement results in serious
deprivation of care-not the humane treatment for which the involun-
tary confinement is legally justified. If one were to reflect which is the
more serious deprivation of civil rights-involuntary hospitalization
when treatment is not needed or involuntary confinement that produces
deprivation of needed treatment--one's conclusion might cause dis-
turbing reflections on the total lack of legal remedy for the latter
situation.
That this most vulnerable group of citizens still suffers unbelievable
deprivation of care and treatment in most states is acknowledged by
practically all practitioners and administrators familiar with the state
mental institutions. The medical-legislative-judicial complex has never
been able to fuse in any state a momentum sufficient to overcome this
hiatus in the protection of the basic civil rights of life and liberty.
III. A MODERN PRESCRIPTION: PENNSYLVANIA'S
"RIGHT To TREATMENT" DRAFT ACT7 2
The proposed Pennsylvania legislative experiment evolved from
the ideas of Dr. F. Lewis Bartlett, 3 Michael Johnson, 74 Executive Vice
70. The witnesses before the Penna. Joint Hearings, supra note 4, and witnesses
appearing before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, supra note 7, sounded
distressingly near unanimous in their bleak assessment of treatment standards through-
out the U.S.
71. FIFTEEN INDICES, supra note 64; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Provisional Patient Move-
ment and Administrative Data etc., supra note 50.
72. The "Right to Treatment" bill, currently introduced as S.B. 158; in the 1967-68
legislative session identified as S.B. 1274 and H.B. 2118.
73. Graduate, University of Vermont Medical School; internship, St. John's Hospital,
Tulsa, Oklahoma; training in psychiatry, University of Louisville and University of
Pennsylvania; former member of staff of Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, Phila-
delphia. Presently a psychiatric physician, Haverford State Hospital, Pennsylvania; Author,
Institutional Peonage: Our Explotation of Mental Patients, ATLANTIC, Vol. 214, No. 1,
July, 1964; paper, Present-Day Requirements for State Hospitals Joining the Community,
presented at the Annual Meeting, American Psychiatric Association, Atlantic City, New
Jersey, May 12, 1966, and published, 276 NEw ENCLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 90, (1967);
The Third Mental Health Revolution and The State Hospital Superintendents, address
to the Annual Meeting, The Association of Medical Superintendents of Mental Hospitals,
Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, 1968.
74. Executive Vice President, Penna. AFL-CIO since 1962; Director, Pennsylvania
Mental Health, Inc., since 1956; Member and former Director, National Association of
Mental Health; served on numerous advisory committees during tenure of Penna. Gov-
ernors George M. Leader (1955-59) and David L. Lawrence (1959-63).
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President of Pennsylvania AFL-CIO and Morton Birnbaum.7 5 These
three men directed their efforts to establishing a legally enforceable
"right-to-treatment" with an accompanying rationale. In early 1965
the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO had the authors of this article formulate
their ideas into a legislative solution and legal approach for discus-
sion. 6 The result, the Pennsylvania "Right to Treatment" bill, utilizes
a classic pattern in the manner in which it defines the cooperative roles
of legislature, administrative agency and judicial forum. It adopts this
pattern to the problem in a manner totally different from any other
approach either now being utilized or suggested.
There are no known suggested, model, or draft acts that confront and
work through the admittedly difficult problems, as the Pennsylvania
"Right to Treatment" bill does. Since it is "sui generis," more or less, at
least so far, it appears worthwhile to present the bill's philosophy, dis-
cuss its mechanisms, and invite comment in the anticipation that its
basic provisions can be utilized as a model act.
A. Basic Ingredients
Several objectives were pursued by the authors of this article in
drafting the "Right to Treatment Law:"
1 To create a "procedure" for developing defined standards that
75. Engaged in both the general practice of medicine and the general practice of law.
A member of the New York Bar, he has advocated before the courts judicial recognition
of an enforceable right to treatment for mental patients. See, for example, People ex rel.
"Anonymous" v. La Burt, 27 Misc. 2d 584, 211 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1961) petition for writ of
habeas corpus denied; direct appeal denied, 9 N.Y.2d 794, 215 N.Y.S.2d 507, N.E.2d
165 (1961); aff'd, 14 A.2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1961); leave to appeal denied; 10 N.Y.2d
708 (1961); cert. denied, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, 369 U.S. 428 (1961).
Author: Some Questions that a Lawyer May Ask a Psychiatrist Concerning the Psyco-
path Before the Law, 261 NFw ENG. J. MED. 1220 (1959); Right to Treatment, 46 AMR.
BAR Assoc. J. 499 (1960); Eugenic Sterilization, 175 J.A.M.A. 951 (1961); Book Review,
Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study, Hollingshead, A.B. and Redlich,
F.C., (1958), 47 A.B.A.J. 81 (1961); Some Comments on The Right to Treatment, presented
to Nervous and Mental Diseases Section, Amer. Med. Assoc. 113th Annual Meeting, June
24, 1964; printed 13 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT., 34, July 1965.
Witness: Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, Part I, Civic Aspects, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the judiciary, U.S.
Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 273-305 (1961); Public Hearings on S.B. 1274 and H.B. 2118
(The Right to Treatment Law of 1968), Joint House and Senate Committees on Public
Health and Welfare, General Assembly. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, pp. 178-205
(1968).
Advanced Studies: Post doctoral fellow 1958-59 in Harvard University training pro-
gram for social scientists in medicine and a research fellow in the Department of Social
Relations of Harvard University.
76. In 1967, 2,500 delegates to the Eighth Annual Constitutional Convention of the
Pennsylvania AFL-CIO unanimously adopted a resolution obligating 1.5 million members
to strive for eventual enactment of the first statutory guarantees of "right-to-treatment"
for mental patients.
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would be simultaneously objective (i.e. measurable) and yet be
adaptable to changing concepts within the medical disciplines
(the details of such standards are developed more flexibly out-
side the rigid confines of a statute and more objectively outside
the administrative milieu responsible for execution);
2. To specify administrative procedures for achieving the treatment
standards and for reviewing and correcting patient complaints
that would fit into existing state administrative organization but
also operate with a minimum of red tape and patient confusion;
3. To provide judicial remedies that are precise, certain and effec-
tive and are available to every patient in case of administrative
failure to meet the required treatment standards.
Several drafting principles had to be carefully adhered to. When an
individual's civil rights are to be protected through procedures carried
out within the framework of a large state government bureaucracy, the
statutory directives cannot avoid touching bases in the administrative
ball park. Similarly, when judicial remedies are being provided by
statute, the failure, through a misguided attempt to retain literary
informality, to employ the terms of art consistently used in exist-
ing law for identical procedures and concepts often creates un-
anticipated problems. On the other hand, too many statutory schemes
for ameliorating social problems flounder by entangling the intended
beneficiaries in bureaucratic maze and at the same time overwhelming
an already overburdened bureaucracy.
Our approach was to keep each statutorily prescribed step as close
as possible to the ultimate objective-the guarantee of treatment
reaching at least the defined minimum level for each mental institution
patient.
Assuming that a state, as a matter of public policy, is prepared to
recognize each institutionalized mental patient's right to treatment as
a legally enforceable right, exactly what is it the patient should have
a right to have enforced? Remembering that each legal right imposes
a correlative legal obligation on someone else, the necessity for a rea-
sonably precise definition and delineation of the legally enforceable
treatment standards becomes obvious.
To date, substantial difficulties inherent in formulating treatment
standards and procedures appropriate for both departmental applica-
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tion and judicial enforcement have probably been major obstacles to
official recognition of this right in any state.77
The Pennsylvania experiment may finally establish a workable form-
ula. Its approach is completely unique, minimizing required ancillary
red-tape, record keeping, etc., and maintaining a direct route between
delineation of enforceable standards and judicial redress for failure
to receive treatment.
B. A Detailed Prognosis and Diagnosis
Basically the Pennsylvania draft legislation provides:
1. A formal structure and procedure for establishing, defining, and
delineating enforceable institutional treatment standards;
2. Direction, with fixed initial time limits, for implementing the
standards;
3. Internal departmental procedures for protecting the patient's
rights through: (a) required notices to the patient and mainten-
ance of proper treatment records, (b) patient recourse to a depart-
mental review board, (c) opportunity for adjustment by the
institution after departmental review;
4. Patient rights to the judicial remedies of mandamus or manda:
tory injunction or habeas corpus, and, in any event, the absolute
right to the remedy of psychiatric treatment by independent
practitioner of patient's choice, whether or not the patient is
released from the institution as a result of his judicial appeal.
77. Judge Bazelon's comments on the roles of court, legislative and administrative
agencies in his testimony on the Penna. "Right to Treatment" bill before the Penna.
Joint Committee (supra, note 4) gives perspective to the interrelationship of the bill's
procedural provisions (p. 231):
Many people argue that it is the business of the legislature and not the court to estab-
lish and define the right to treatment. I, of course, believe the judiciary can play a
role, but I will be the first to admit that in most instances, the legislature can do a
better job. A court can only lay down broad policy outlines as to whether or not the
procedure violates the constitution, but the legislature can create specific procedure
and institutions to implement the right to treatment.
For example, in my opinion in Rouse v. United States, I suggested that St. Eliza-
beth's Hospital, with 500 patients, should establish internal administrative procedures
to oversee the adequacy of treatment, and I have continued to make this point in
subsequent opinions. But, I could not require the hospital to set up administrative
review boards and to the best of my knowledge they have not yet done so. Your bill,
on the other hand, expressly provides for internal administrative procedures. These
procedures will enable the hospitals to examine their own actions and practices and
thereby to decide before a case goes to court whether its actions should be corrected
or defended. These procedures will insure that fewer cases come to court and that
the cases which do come are ripe for proper consideration and decision.
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In Pennsylvania the maintenance and supervision of public mental
institutions is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mental Health,
Department of Public Welfare. The Pennsylvania "Right to Treat-
ment" draft act calls for two structural entities to effect the intradepart-
mental responsibilities to patients. First is the Mental Treatment
Standards Committee,78 charged with promulgating a manual of mini-
mum treatment standards. The second vehicle is the Patient Treat-
ment Review Board,79 whose responsibility is to review patient com-
plaints alleging failure to receive adequate treatment.
The seven-member Treatment Standards Committee is to be com-
posed of a non-administrator psychiatrist, a psychiatrist who is a mental
institution administrator, a physician, a psychiatric social worker, a
clinical psychologist, a nurse, and the Commissioner of Mental Health,
who is to serve in an advisory capacity only. Each member is to be
selected by the Secretary of Public Welfare (with the advice of the
Pennsylvania Advisory Committee for Mental Health) from three
names submitted to him by the appropriate statutorily designated na-
tional professional association. The designation of national rather than
state associations is deliberate, to obtain the advantage of greater variety
of experience in institutional programming. Except for the administra-
tor-psychiatrist, no member of this committee may have been retained
in any capacity by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or any of its
subdivisions or agencies, during the three-year period preceding the
appointment, nor may he be otherwise employed by the state while
he serves on the Committee nor for five years after his committee tenure
expires. This restriction is deemed advisable in order to minimize
potential state administration influence on committee members to
adopt weak standards.8 0
The Committee must be appointed within 90 days after the act's
effective date; must have its manual of minimum standards completed
within six months after it has been appointed (Committee receipt of
compensation is contingent on completion of the standards manual
within the specified time). The Committee-adopted minimum standards
become the mandatory standards for departmental implementation and
also the basis for each patient's legally enforceable treatment right.8'
78. Penna. S.B. 158, "Right to Treatment Law of 1969," Sec. 3. See Appendix Exhibit
II, P. 67.
79. Penna. S.B. 158, Sec. 6.
80. Penna. S.B. 158, Sec. 3(f).
81. Penna. S.B. 158, Sec. 3(a) and Sec. 4.
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Although the Committee is a permanent one (its members serving
staggered six year terms), it is expected to meet and serve only period-
ically and is to be compensated on a contractual basis. It is charged with
periodic standards review and with making such changes as it deems
necessary once every two years, thus guaranteeing flexibility in adopting
required standards to actual institutional needs and to advances in
medical knowledge.8 2
Special factors have to be dealt with in developing a statutory prescrip-
tion for implementing patient rights. Among these are the special nature
of the disability requiring protection, the institutional setting, the
governmental-administrative envelope around the institution, the kinds
of legal remedies available, and the kinds of obligations and liabilities
created for those charged with implementing the legally required
treatment standards.
Establishing enforceable treatment standards for the mentally dis-
abled in public institutions is a different proposition from setting
standards for private treatment of other medical infirmities such as
broken bones or pneumonia. The term mental illness encompasses
many different kinds of disability ranging from the generalized degenera-
tive processes of old age, to disorientation caused by the various more
localized origins of chemical imbalance or organic damage, to malfunc-
tioning produced by unbearable stress of environmental or personal
life problems. Different forms of treatment are called for, depending
on the nature and origin of the disability.
Practitioners differ as to the appropriate treatment approaches in
many cases. Even diagnosis remains a more imprecise art than for the
more strictly physical ailments. Circumstances outside but related to
the individual usually have a more intimate relationship to both the
disability and the treatment process. Given these circumstances,
attempts to set standards in terms of type and quality of each individ-
ual treatment would be foolhardy.
There are some who feel the statutory right to treatment should
include the right to review the quality of treatment methods employed
by institutional practitioners and the judgment, care and skill em-
ployed in their individual treatment relationships. The common law
right to redress for practitioner negligence in diagnostic and treatment
procedures exists, of course, and is at least theoretically available to
82. Penna. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(i).
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any patient. This common law right is expressly saved from any inter-
ference by the statutory provisions. It was concluded, however, that,
mainly for the reasons stated here, the draft act should also expressly
exclude review of the level of skill, care and judgment employed by
practitioners from the scope of the statute's application.
The extensive incidence of deplorable lack of care and treatment
in public mental institutions throughout much of the United States
is rarely the result of individual practitioners' negligence. It is generally
a matter of legislative-administrative-institutional inertia in relation
to providing the wherewithal and then obtaining adequate numbers
of trained personnel and facilities. By comparison with the private
sector, if standards safeguarding against insufficient staffs, overcrowding,
inadequate medical care, patient records, and physical examinations,
improper food, lack of safety and hygienic conditions, that are legis-
latively imposed on non-profit and proprietary nursing homes for the
welfare of the aged and ill, were administratively applied as the test
for adequate care and treatment for the states' mental hospitals, many
would be in open violation of the law.8 3
The Treatment Standards Committee is directed by the draft act to
include in its standards coverage of such matters as maximum per-
mitted staff-patient ratios; required minimum qualifications of staff,
including degrees, licensure, certification, apprenticeship and expe-
rience; minimum number of individual psychiatric consultations for
each patient per given period of time; frequency and extent of physical
examinations; and maintenance of individualized treatment plans.84
What standards, if any, should be written into the draft act itself
turned out to be the most vexing drafting problem to confront the
authors. What elements were so crucial they should not be left to
83. For example, regulations for non-profit and profit nursing homes require for each
patient the medical supervision of a state licensed physician; a yearly physical exam;
privacy for each person's personal dignity during physical exams, treatment, toileting
and bathing, a plan of care based upon medical examinations to provide staff direction
to rehabilitation needs; a complete periodic, medical record and physician's progress
record from admission to discharge. In addition, required is 24 hour nursing service by
a registered nurse for each 20 patients; a day duty registered or practical nurse-patient
ratio of 1:8 to 1:20 at night; a minimum average of two general nursing hours per patient
per day; beds in multi-bed rooms shall have four feet of open space between adjacent
.beds with no more than four beds per room and no more than eight beds per infirmary
room; a bathtub for each 10 patients; 1 toliet to 6 patients. PENNA. DEPT. OF WELFARE,
OFFICE OF THE AGING, Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Infirmary Units and Nursing
Homes of Nonprofit Homes and Rules and Regulations pertaining to Nursing Homes
operated for a profit, effective Dec. 1, 1967, pursuant to PUBLIC WELFARE CODE, P.L. 21,
June 3, 1967.
84. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(b), (c), (d).
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chance or to committee discretion? The temptation was overwhelming
to write in certain "absolute minimums," such as requiring a certain
number of consultations per year, etc. One general and two specific
requirements were finally included (but only after much debate):
the minimum standards for numbers and qualifications of staff and
number of individual consultations shall be no lower than the
standards established by the American Psychiatric Association;
and they shall also include requirements that all psychiatrists and
medical practitioners must have the qualifications that are required
to obtain Pennsylvania licensing for private practice . 5
The other specific requirement is that individual treatment plans
must be maintained.8 6
The general statutory outline of standards coverage concentrates
mainly on the institutional staff who have a direct responsibility to the
patient. It is based on the premise that the important medical judg-
ments at the root of meaningful hospitalization should be made by
persons who have actually acquired, through appropriate training and
experience, the expertise necessary to treat mentally disabled patients.
The deliberate direction to the Treatment Standards Committee to
promulgate minimum standards only, not average or ideal standards,
takes into account the present inadequacy of facilities, equipment and
personnel which makes adherence to high medical standards for those
most in need difficult if not impossible.
After the Treatment Standards Committee has adopted a set of
standards, they become the official state standards for mental institution
treatment. The Department of Welfare and each institution is then
charged with the responsibility of obtaining the personnel and imple-
menting the changes necessary to meet the designated standards. The
Department is given another year and three months (two years from
the act's effective date) to bring the institutions' staffs and practices up
to the adopted standards.8 7 At the end of this period patients acquire
the enforceable legal right to treatment which meets the adopted
standards.""
In the meantime the Department is also charged with the duty (while
the committee is completing its manual) to make studies sufficient to
85. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(c).
86. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(b)(5).
87. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(0.
88. S.B. 158, Sec. 5(a).
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report to the Legislature within one year of the act's effective date (or
three months after the committee's work completion date) cost and
other appropriate data pertinent to implementing the statutory re-
quirements. 89 The Legislature will need this data in order to plan for
sufficient appropriations and to take steps that will encourage increased
availability of professional institutional personnel in Pennsylvania.
While patients' mental disabilities vary widely, the impaired ability
of many to understand their rights and to measure them against actual
institutional performance requires special attention. Stringent notice
requirements are deemed necessary and are provided for. Notice must
be given also to the guardian, legally liable relative or next friend.
These required notices must include a brief but specific synopsis of
the minimum standards, a statement that the patient has the legal right
to have these standards met, and a statement of the legal remedies
available to the patient, including his right to engage a private psychia-
trist and an attorney to present his appeal to the court.90
The first tribunal to review a patient's formal complaint is the
Patient Treatment Review Board. In contrast to the Standards Com-
mittee, the Review Board is a continuing, full-time board employed
under the Civil Service merit system. It hears, investigates, decides
and issues rulings on patients' petitions alleging lack of adequate treat-
ment. The board is to consist of two psychiatrists, two physicians and
one lawyer. They are to be provided with staff; and their procedures
for handling patient petitions are to be governed by departmental regu-
lations.9' Each patient has the right to appear before the board and be
heard, if he desires. But there is no requirement that a hearing be held
if the petitioner does not request one. He may also be represented by
an agent, who may be, but need not be, an attorney. Also, since a patient
may lack sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions
due to his illness, the petition for review need not be brought by the
patient himself, but may be brought on his behalf by a guardian, rela-
tive or friend. Proceedings before the board are not to be conducted
as adversary proceedings.
92
Informality at the board review level is considered desirable to pre-
vent inhibiting patients from seeking redress, to minimize adverse
89. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(g).
90. S.B. 158, Sec. 5(c).
91. S.B. 158, Sec. 6(a) through (d).
92. S.B. 158, Sec. 7.
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psychological reaction, to avoid having evidence that might be helpful
excluded, and to make it easier for the institution and the petitioner
to work together toward better treatment after the board's review.
Adversary proceedings might tend to discourage post-review cooperation.
In each case in which the board finds that a patient's care and treat-
ment does not meet the adopted standards, the institution, if the super-
intendent concurs in the finding and agrees to improve the treatment,
is given a three-month probationary period to improve treatment to
the required level. In all other instances, petitioners have the right to
take court action after the board has issued its findings or upon the
board's failure to issue a finding within a month from the date of the
petition.93
In lieu of court action by the patient (in a case in which a patient is
entitled to petition the court), the board may, in its discretion, and with
the agreement of the institution and the patient, certify to the Depart-
ment of Welfare the patient's medical eligibility for treatment by a
private psychiatrist. In every case of such certification the patient be-
comes entitled to obtain private psychiatric treatment, paid by the
Commonwealth. 94
The Pennsylvania bill has been criticized as not going far enough to
ensure review of severely disabled patients' treatment. It has been sug-
gested that the Treatment Review Board should be required to review
these cases on its own initiative.95 The criticism is probably warranted,
particularly since a surprisingly large number of patients have no one
outside the institution who maintains contact or is actively concerned
about the patient's welfare. There are, however, pitfalls in such a
statutory requirement. When no one is actively representing the pos-
sibly aggrieved person, investigations have a tendency to become pro
forma and ultimately become an actual deterrent to appropriate
action.
Upon appeal to court a patient is entitled to both a psychiatrist and
a lawyer of his choice (subject to the practitioner's willingness to be
engaged) to present his case, 96 either de novo or on the record only,
according to petitioner's preference.97 The psychiatrist will be in the
93. S.B. 158, Sec. 7(a)(3).
94. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(m).
95. See, Judge Bazelon's testimony before the Penna. Joint Hearings supra note 4, at
234.
96. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(g) and (h).
97. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(f).
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nature of an expert witness, presenting technical testimony on the
patient's needs, 8 as well as the institution staff levels and adherence to
required procedures.
Although the relative informality of the proceedings before the
Patient Treatment Review Board may fail to produce a completely
satisfactory record for court review, when review is on the record only,
it is deemed necessary to allow the patient (or petitioner) this choice
on appeal, because of the expense and other practical difficulties of
presenting all evidence again as if there had been no board preceeding.
Therefore, the petitioner has the choice, on appeal, of presenting the
evidence de novo or appealing on the record only, from the review
board.
The petitioner may seek several remedies in the alternative. Habeas
corpus, mandatory injunction, or mandamus are the choices, with the
right to private psychiatric care paid by the Commonwealth being
absolute in every case where the court finds treatment did not meet
the statutory standards.99 Since it is anticipated that many patients
placed in institutions as an outcome of criminal proceedings will peti-
tion for habeas corpus and be denied the writ because of their status
in relation to the previous criminal proceedings, the right to petition
in the same proceeding for either mandamus or mandatory injunction
provides a possible remedy. The draft act gives the courts the discre-
tion, in a habeas corpus proceeding, where the patient is in the institu-
tion as a result of some form or stage of criminal proceeding, of if
he is demonstrably dangerous to himself or others, to order the patient
transferred to another institution where he will receive adequate care.
In all other cases where the petitioner requests a writ of habeas corpus
and the court finds he did not receive adequate treatment, habeas
corpus must be granted. 100
In every case where the court finds the patient did not receive the
statutory standard of treatment, the patient has an absolute right
(whether or not he requests it) to have the court order the Department
to provide payment for treatment by a private psychiatrist of the
patient's choice, whether the patient remains in an institution or is
released. The patient is entitled to one half hour consultation per week
if he remains in the institution and two half hour consultations a week
98. S.B. 158, Sec. 4(b)(3) and (5).
99. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(c).
100. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(c)(2).
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if he is released.10 1 Just as the "almshouse" concept was long ago dis-
carded for indigent persons who could function without extensive sup-
portive services, so the time has come to free mentally disabled persons
from the death trap of institutional vegetation.
The patient or anyone legally liable for his support is liable for
reimbursement to the Commonwealth on the same basis as liability
exists for reimbursement of regular institutional care. The Common-
wealth must provide payment in the first instance, however. Many
patients do not recognize that they need treatment and would not obtain
it if payment were denied on the grounds that legally liable relatives
are able to pay.
Public payment for private psychiatric treatment may disturb tra-
ditionalists who will view it as yet another "socialized welfare scheme."
In reality, however, it is merely an alternative mechanism (one that
has been estimated by some mental health specialists as ultimately less
costly than the present institutional milieu) for meeting one of the
earliest assumed public welfare obligations. The Whitree case is a good
example.10 2 New York State paid for 12 years of custodial care that
would have been unnecessary had it furnished this patient with psy-
chiatric treatment for two years or less. The procedural mechanisms
for handling public payment of private practitioner services are by now
well established, and can be comfortably adapted to this need.
Experience has demonstrated universally that the changes needed to
bring about an acceptable minimum level of treatment are not likely
to occur by relying on administrative discretion. 03
Public institution regime presents many dynamics absent in private
treatment relationships. The various specialties that are at least
potentially available for any one patient's care-psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, social worker, therapist, nurse, attendant, etc.--demand an intra-
institutional coordination that is delicately balanced according to many
considerations. Administrative stresses, housekeeping functions, security
101. S.B. 158, Sec. 8(j).
102. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
103. Dr. David J. Vail, Medical Director, Department of Public Welfare, Minnesota,
in his appearance before the Pennsylvania Joint Committee, supra note 4, commented at
page 141 on this part of the Draft Act:
I think this bill goes a long way toward defining treatment in the sense that it
creates a procedure to do so, and this is the crucial first step. What I like about
it is the clear rule of law requiring that the definition be made and the standards
be laid down as a mandate to the public agency complete with deadline, and the
matter is not left to the good intentions of the porfessionals in the field, who so far
on their own devices have not done very well ....
Duquesne Law Review
considerations, legal obligations connected with trusteeship of incom-
petents and custody of persons under the jurisdiction of the criminal
courts exert unavoidable influences on the total treatment configura-
tion. This configuration is even further controlled by the placement
of the institution somewhere in the government administrative bureauc-
racy, with its inevitable regulations, statutes, and budgetary strictures.
The patient's legal right to a certain standard of treatment creates
the custodian's legal obligation to provide that standard. It becomes
important, therefore, not only that the patient or someone on his behalf
can determine in concrete, measurable terms what that right is, but also
that those responsible for his care can determine what their legal obli-
gation is. The sensitivity of this side of the equation becomes more
apparant when it is realized that the individuals charged with this
obligation are representatives and employees of the sovereign state and
are not free to act as they personally might deem necessary in order
to discharge their obligations.
These factors have to be taken into account in developing a statutory
formula for ensuring an enforceable patient right to treatment. They
were resolved in the "Pennsylvania Right to Treatment" bill in a num-
ber of ways: by devising a procedure for setting the standards that com-
bined medical expertise, independent of the bureaucracy, with at least
one representative of the state administration and one public institu-
tion administrator; by requiring that the scope of the required stand-
ards remain objective rather than subjective-i.e., that the standards
be easily definable and observable instead of wandering into the realm
of treatment techniques; by requiring stringent notice requirements;
by providing as much leeway as possible for adjustments before a
patient appeals to the courts; by providing institution administrators
with the option of arranging for private treatment if they are unable
to provide the required standard of care.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article is neither designed to cause embarrassment nor place
blame for the deplorable plight of the mentally disabled on any person,
profession, administration, court or legislative body. There is plenty
of blame for everyone in today's society to bare and share with preced-
ing generations who likewise tolerated these conditions. The history
of suffering of that long line of hapless and helpless mentally ill, that
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stretches back through the ages, can neither be rewritten to please us
nor blotted out to hide our shame. The hope of this article is in offering
a constructive program, with a view from the past, to reduce the suffer-
ing of that long line of disabled, the living and unborn, that will reach
forward in the years to come.
A prescription is offered by the Pennsylvania "Right to Treatment"
draft act for escaping the terrible dilemma of most states-neither
their courts nor their legislatures dare recognize the basic rights of
their public mental institution patients to adequate treatment, because
of the fear they would be inundated with suits seeking redress for
inevitable neglect. Yet they know that sooner or later their patients'
constitutional rights are likely to be decreed from some source over
which they have no control, with the sudden cost then totally unpre-
dictable. They know, too, that their general, well-intended policy edicts
have been ineffective to cause administrative raising of standards to
levels that could ease consciences.
The draft act sets a date in the future after which patients' rights to
treatment henceforth cannot be thwarted. It provides, however, an in-
terim period of grace for planned departmental action to meet objec-
tive, measurable standards. It offers a relatively independent vehicle
and an orderly procedure for establishing the treatment standards,
preventing the necessity for ad hoc judicial development of mandated
medical standards.
Perhaps most salient, it grants leverage and possible escape for ad-
ministrative officials if, in spite of reasonably adequate funding, they
cannot find sufficient personnel or, for whatever other reasons, they
cannot meet the required standards; and yet the patients are assured
of access to treatment, whether or not they leave the institution.
Colonial Pennsylvania pioneered in early humanitarian attempts to
provide crude maintenance for the "qyut madd" in "private cages and
strong rooms." Later, the Commonwealth stood in the forerank to
establish legal due process for "lunaticks" incarcerated in "asylums."
Today, the State's General Assembly is poised on the threshold of a
new era for the "mentally ill"-granting them medical due process
through an enforceable "Right to Treatment" in true "mental
hospitals."
For the mentally disabled, the gorge separating their mere commit-
ment from meaningful treatment has stood as a deep barrier through-
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out the ages. But for State legislators, the distance is only a step across.
The Pennsylvania "Right to Treatment" bill has been characterized by
nationally recognized jurists and mental health experts alike as a "his-
toric document '' 104 "that can become a model for the nation."'05° The
concept and workable procedure embodied in this experiment in
medical due process are now in the public domain, available to any
legislative forum that has the courage to meet this obligation to an
increasing and mute constituency.
104. Dr. Francis Tyce, Penna Joint Committee, supra note 4, at 50.
105. Judge Bazelon, in his testimony before the Penna. Joint Committee, supra note 4,
(at 230): characterized the "Right to Treatment" bill in this way,
S.B. 1274, your right to treatment bill, is a major advance in the mental health field.
I am sure that it will become a model for similar legislation throughout the nation.
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EXHIBIT II
Section 1. SHORT TITLE.-This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Right to
Treatment Law of 1969."
Section 2. DEFINITIONS.-As used in this act:
(1) "Board" means the Patient Treatment Review Board.
(2) "Committee" means the Mental Treatment Standards Committee.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Public Welfare.
(4) "Manual" means the "Manual of Minimum Standards for Treatment of Mentally
Ill in State Mental Institutions" prepared by the committee.
(5) "Minimum standards" means those standards prepared and adopted by the commit-
tee and contained in the manual.
(6) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Public Welfare.
Section 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF MENTAL TREATMENT STANDARDS COMMITrEE.-(a) A committee
shall be appointed within ninety days after the effective date of this act by the secretary,
with the advice of the Pennsylvania Advisory Committee for Mental Health which
shall be known as the Mental Treatment Standards Committee.
(b) The Mental Treatment Standards Committee shall be composed of seven members
as follows:
(1) A licensed non-administrator psychiatrist who is a member of the American
Psychiatric Association;
(2) A licensed physician who is not a psychiatrist and who is a member of the
American Medical Association;
(3) A psychiatric social worker who is a member of the Committee of Psychiatry of
the National Association of Social Workers and who has had at least five years experience
in institutional psychiatric social work;
(4) A clinical psychologist holding a Ph. D. and who is a member of the Clinical
Psychologists of the American Psychological Association;
(5) A licensed psychiatrist who is a member of the National Association of Medical
Superintendents of Mental Hospitals and who has had at least five years of experience as
a mental institution administrator;
(6) A registered professional nurse who is a member of the Psychiatric and Mental
Health Division of the American Nurses Association; and
(7) The Commissioner of Mental Health of the Department of Public Welfare.
(c) The Commissioner of Mental Health shall serve on the committee in an advisory
capacity only and shall have no vote in the adoption of minimum mental treatment
standards. He shall obtain and make available to the committee any data, statistics and
information relating but not limited to State mental institutions, personnel and patients
that the committee requests in the course of its research and preparation of minimum
standards.
(d) The secretary shall request the presiding officer of each of the appropriate profes-
sional associations named above to recommend to him the names of three persons who
would be willing to accept appointment and the secretary shall appoint each member
from the three names recommended to him by these associations.
(e) The committee members shall be appointed for six year terms except that the
first appointed members shall serve staggered terms as follows:
(1) The registered professional nurse-two years;
(2) The psychiatric social worker-two years;
(3) The clinical psychologist-three years;
(4) The physician-four years;
(5) The psychiatrist-administrator-five years;
(6) The psychiatrist recommended by the American Psychiatric Association-six years.
(f) No member shall be appointed who was employed or retained by the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania or any of its subdivisions or any agency thereof at any time
during the three year period immediately preceding appointment nor may any member
be so employed or retained while he is a member of the committee, nor for five years
thereafter: Provided, however, That these restrictions shall not apply to the psychiatrist
who is a member of the National Association of Superintendents of Mental Hospitals.
(g) The committee shall be compensated for its services on a contractual basis by the
Department of Welfare, but shall be compensated only if it performs the services herein
specified within the time limits specified.
Section 4. PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF MINIMUM STANDARDS.-(a) The Mental Treat-
ment Standards Committee shall prepare and adopt a "Manual of Minimum Standards
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for Treatment of Mentally Ill in State Mental Institutions," which shall, in the opinion
of the committee be acceptable to the professional associations named in section 3 and
represented by the members of the committee.
(b) These standards shall specifically include, but shall not be limited to the fol-
lowing matters:
(1) The number of professional and non-professional staff, whose responsibilities are
directly related to patient treatment or care, per patient population, including the
maximum number of patients for each psychiatrist, physician, clinical psychologist,
social worker, industrial therapist, nurse and attentant or aide;
(2) The required minimum qualifications for each professional and non-professional
staff position, referred to in clause (1) of subsection (b) of section 4, including degrees,
licensure, certification, apprenticeship, or experience;
(3) The minimum number of individual consultations each patient shall have with
a psychiatrist and other appropriate professional personnel and the minimum number
of hours of such individual consultations each patient shall have in each thirty day
period, taking into account, if deemed appropriate, varying standards for the following
categories: (i) immediately after admission and for diagnostic purposes, (ii) treatment as
indicated by individual conditions and need, (iii) pre- and post-institutional release period
for home, occupation, and community adjustment, including continuing therapy after
the patient leaves the institution, if not provided by other mental health facilities;
(4) The frequency and extent of general physicial examinations; and
(5) Requirements for maintenance of the individualized treatment plans for each
patient which shall include but not be limited to: (i) the initial diagnosis, (ii) the manner
in which the facilities of the particular institution can improve the patient's condition,
(iii) the treatment goals, and, (iv) the treatment regimen that is planned to accomplish
these goals, subject to the limitation provided in subsection (d) of section 4.
(c) The minimum standards for numbers and qualifications of staff and number of
individual consultations shall be no lower than the standards established by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association; and they shall also include requirements that all psychiatrists
and medical practitioners must have the qualifications that are required to obtain
Pennsylvania licensing for private practice.
(d) The committee shall not include in its standards any requirements relating to
selection and conduct by individual psychiatrists, physicians or clinical psychologists of
their treatment methods or procedures, nor the judgment, skill or care used by these
practitioners. The standards promulgated by the committee shall be expressed in ob-
jective terms so far as possible in order to minimize the necessity for subjective evaluation
of departmental and institutional compliance, in judicial review.
(e) The committee shall present to the secretary within six months after its appoint-
ment the completed "Manual of Minimum Standards for Treatment of Mentally Ill in
State Mental Institutions" and the minimum standards as promulgated by the committee
and set forth in such manual shall be the minimum standards as promulgated by the
committee and set forth in such manual shall be the minimum standards of treatment
for all patients confined in State mental institutions in Pennsylvania, beginning two years
from the effective date of this act, and such manual shall be a public document.
(f) The secretary shall immediately upon receipt of said manual from the committee
furnish to the superintendent of each State mental institution copies of the manual; shall
allocate sufficient resources necessary for the State mental institutions to be able to pro-
vide at least the minimum staffing standards; and shall provide advice and assistance to
such institutions in their preparation to meet the minimum standards as set forth in
the aforesaid manual.
(g) The department shall make studies to determine the additional personnel neces-
sary to meet the requirements of this act. A report shall be prepared and be presented to
the General Assembly within one year from the effective date of this act, giving cost and
other appropriate data.
(h) Each State mental institution shall be responsible for maintaining complete and
accurate records of treatment furnished persons confined therein. The record of treatment
for each patient may be kept in his individual case record and is not required to be
otherwise recorded or compiled. The records shall be maintained, however, in such man-
ner that determination can be made at any time whether minimum standards of treat-
ment are being furnished to any particular person confined therein. Each patient's
records shall be fully available at any time to his independently engaged psychiatrist or
attorney and to the Patient Care Review Board hereinfter designated.
(i) The Mental Treatment Standards Committee shall periodically review the minimum
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treatment standards manual and shall make such changes as it decides are necessary. Once
every two years the committee shall submit to the secretary a list of all such changes, and
these changes shall become amendments to the "Minimum Standards." The manual shall
be amended accordingly, and the secretary shall forthwith furnish copies to the director
of each State mental institution. Such amendments shall become effective and patients'
legal rights to such amended minimum standards of treatment shall vest within three
months after the committee has forwarded the amendments to the secretary.
Section 5. PATIENT'S LEGAL RIGHT TO MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT.-(a) Beginning
immediately upon the expiration of two years from the effective date of this act, every
person who is then or at any time thereafter confined, voluntarily or involuntarily, in a
State mental institution, shall have the legal right to receive at all times while so confined
at least minimum treatment as herein defined.
(b) The right to minimum standards of treatment provided by this act shall not
include the right to have reviewed the judgment, skill or care used by individual psychi-
atrists, physicians or clinical psychologists. Any such rights and remedies existing by
common law or other statutes shall not be hereby impaired.
(c) Beginning immediately upon the expiration of two years from the effective date
of this act, every person then confined in any State mental institution and every person
thereafter admitted to any such institution and each such person's legal guardian or
designated responsible relative or friend shall be furnished with a brief but specific
synopsis of the minimum standards of treatment, together with a statement of the
patient's legal right to such minimum standards henceforth, and the legal remedies avail-
able if such patient fails to receive such treatment, including the patient's right to be
represented by a psychiatrist and an attorney of his choice (subject to the consent of any
psychiatrist or attorney to be retained by the patient) in the pursuit of his legal remedies.
Said synopsis shall be in plain and simple language and shall be in printed form large
enough to be easily read.
Section 6. PATIENT TREATMENT REvIEW BOARD.--(a) The secretary shall appoint a
Patient Treatment Review Board, consisting of two licensed psychiatrists, two licensed
medical practitioners and one attorney, who shall not serve the Commonwealth or any of
its agencies or subdivisions in any other remunerative capacity, whose tenure and duties
shall begin immediately upon the expiration of two years from the effective date of this
act.
(b) These board members shall serve on a full-time basis and be employed under the
merit system in accordance with the act of August 5, 1941 (P. L. 752), known as the
"Civil Service Act."
(c) Adequate staff shall be provided to assist the board in its duties and adequate facili-
ties shall be provided.
(d) The duty of the board shall be to receive, hear and investigate petitions filed
on behalf of patients who allege they are not receiving minimum standards of treat-
ment, and to issue findings thereon.
(e) The secretary shall promulgate and issue procedural regulations, not in conflict
with the provisions of this act, which shall guarantee to petitioners proper notice,
fair procedure, and prompt dispositions of petitions.
(f) Three members of the board shall constitute a quorum for transacting business.
Section 7. PATIENTS' LEGAL REmEIS.-(a) Any person confined in a State mental institu-
tion, or his legal guardian or designated responsible relative or friend, who, at any
time after the expiration of two years from the effective date of this act or after three
months subsequent to the date of his admission to the institution, whichever is later, be-
lieves he is not receiving minimum treatment as defined in this act, shall have the right
to take action according to the procedure hereinbelow provided:
(1) Petition the board for a formal determination of whether in fact the patient
has failed to receive the minimum treatment to which he is legally entitled, as provided
in this act; (i) the petition shall be in writing, addressed to the board and be signed by
the patient or his legal guardian or designated responsible relative or friend; (ii) the
petition shall contain a resume of the reasons it is believed the patient is not receiving
the minimum treatment to which he is legally entitled; (iii) the patient may be repre-
sented by an agent designated by him or his legal guardian or designated responsible
relative or friend, in writing. Such agent may be, but is not required to be, an attorney;
but in no event may such designated agent be an employe of or engaged in any capacity
by the Commonwealth or any of its agencies or subdivisions. Such designated agent may
personally represent the patient in any hearings, investigations, or correspondence, and
all institutional and departmental records relating to the issue of adequate treatment
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shall be fully available to such agent. Whether or not any such designated agent is an
attorney, the proceedings before the Patient Treatment Review Board shall not be con-
ducted as adversary proceedings nor with adherence to technical rules in the presenta-
tion of evidence.
(2) The board shall review the petition, hold hearings, make such investigation as
appears appropriate and confer wi th the superintendent of the State mental institution
where the petitioner is confined; (i) the board shall personally review each petition en
banc; (ii) the board shall, within one month after receipt of any petition, issue a written
finding, stating whether or not the patient has failed to receive minimum treatment,
whether the superintendent of the State mental institution concurs in the finding; and,
when the finding is that the patient has not received minimum treatment and that the
superintendent concurs in this finding, whether or not the superintendent agrees to furnish
forthwith said minimum treatment; (iii) the finding shall specify in what respect, if any,
the treatment has failed to meet the minimum standards; (iv) a copy of said findings shall
be forwarded to the petitioner and if petitioner is the person confined in a State mental
institution, then a copy also to petitioner's legal guardian or designated responsible rela-
tive or friend; (v) a copy shall also be forwarded to the superintendent of the State
mental institution.
(3) If the State mental institution superintendent concurs in a finding that minimum
treatment has not been received and agrees to furnish such minimum treatment, a pro-
bationary period of three months shall ensue; (i) immediately at the end of the three
month probationary period the board shall forward a simple inquiry to the petitioner
as to whether the patient on whose behalf the petition was filed has been receiving
minimum treatment during the probationary period; (ii) if the inquiry is returned within
two weeks, signed by the petitioner and witnessed by two persons not associated in any
way with the State mental institution, indicating that minimum treatment is being
received, the review shall be concluded. The response to the inquiry shall be made a
permanent part of the petitioner's records with the board; (iii) if the board does not re-
ceive a response from the petitioner that minimum treatment is being received, it shall
make such further investigation as it deems appropriate and issue a final finding.
(b) Any patient may file or have such a petition filed on his behalf once in any six
months period but no oftener.
Section 8. RIGHT TO PETITION couRT.-(a) In any of the following instances any peti-
tioner may personally or by an attorney of petitioner's choice (subject to the agreement
of the selected attorney to serve as petitioner's counsel) take court action in accordance
with subsections (f) to (n) of section 8 of this act, in respect to the alleged lack of mini-
mum care:
(1) If the board issues a finding that the person on whose behalf the petition was
filed is receiving minimum treatment, and the petitioner does not agree;
(2).If the board finds that the person on whose behalf the petition was filed has not
been receiving minimum treatment and the superintendent of the institution does not
concur in the finding or the superintendent concurs but does not agree to furnish
minimum treatment forthwith;
(3) If the board finds that the person on whose behalf the petition was filed has not
been receiving minimum treatment and the superintendent concurs and agrees to furnish
at least such minimum treatment forthwith, but at the end of the three month proba-
tionary period or any time within three months thereafter the petitioner or the person
on whose behalf the petition was filed believes that minimum treatment has not been
received subsequent to said final finding of the board;
(4) If the board has failed to notify-the petitioner of any finding at the end of one
month from the date of the patient's petition;
(5) If the patient seeks an appeal from the findings of the Patient Treatment Review
Board as provided in subsection (o) of section 8.
(b) Any patient whose petition to the board has been concluded in one or more of
the alternatives cited in subsection (a) of section 8, may petition a court for appropriate
relief, personally or by his guardian or responsible relative or next friend.
(c) The following remedies shall be available: the common law writ of habeas
corpus as modified herein; writ of mandamus; mandatory injunction; order requiring the
Commonwealth to permit, to help arrange for if necessary, any to pay for private psychi-
atric care, either while the patient remains in the institution or after he is released.
(1) Petitioner may petition for any one of the above remedies exclusively; or, he may
petition simultaneously for writ of habeas corpus and either writ of mandamus or manda-
tory injunction..
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(2) If a petitioner requests a writ of habeas corpus and the court finds that peti-
tioner did not receive the minimum standard of treatment as defined in this act, the only
grounds on which the writ of habeas corpus may be denied, in proceedings brought pur-
suant to this act, shall be if the court finds, upon proper evidence that: (i) the patient
is demonstrably dangerous to himself or others if released; or (ii) the patient has been
acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity; or (iii) the patient has been convicted of a
crime and his sentence has not expired; or (iv) the patient has been charged with a
crime and has not yet been tried; or (v) the patient has been convicted of a crime and
committed to a mental institution in lieu of sentence.
(3) The court may in its discretion, on a habeas corpus petition, if it finds any of
the above, order the patient transferred to another suitable mental treatment facility
where at least minimum standards of treatment as defined in this act will be furnished.
(4) In any habeas corpus proceeding the burden of proof shall be on the defendant
to show that its treatment met the minimum standards as defined by this act.
(d) The defendants named in any such action shall be the superintendent of the in-
stitution in which the patient is confined and the secretary.
(e) The petition may include a request for payment of treatment on a private con-
sulting basis, as specified in subsections (i) to (1) of section 8.
(f) Any petitioner proceeding under this act shall have the right, but shall not be
required, to have all evidence presented de novo before the court, and shall have the
right of appeal from any adverse order of the court, as in other such cases.
(g) Each person confined in a State mental institution who believes that he is not
receiving minimum treatment and intends to petition for a finding may engage a psy-
chiatrist of his choice for an independent evaluation (subject to the selected psychiatrist's
agreement to be so retained). The psychiatrist so engaged shall have the right to present
evidence and testimony to the board and to the court in any legal proceeding hereunder.
If the patient is indigent, he shall have the right to have the Commonwealth compen-
sate such psychiatrist with a reasonable fee for such services.
(h) Each person confined in a State mental institution or his legal guardian or
designated responsible relative or next friend initiating court action on his behalf shall
have the right to counsel of petitioner's choice (subject to the attorney's agreement to be
so retained). If the person on whose behalf the petition is filed is indigent, he shall have
the right to have the Commonwealth compensate such council a reasonable sum for such
services.
(i) Any patient shall have the absolute right, in the event the court shall find that he
has not received minimum treatment as defined in this act, to treatment furnished by a
private licensed psychiatrist on a private consulting basis, said treatment to be paid
by the Commonwealth at the rate of twelve dollars and fifty cents ($12.50) for each half
hour consultation.
(j) Such patient shall have the right to have payment furnished for no more than
two private one-half hour consultations per week if the patient is released from the insti-
tution on a writ of habeas corpus and to have payment furnished for no more than one
private one-half hour consultation per week if the patient remains in an institution. The
patient shall have the right to choose his psychiatrist, subject to the requirement that the
psychiatrist so selected must meet the same professional standards as are set forth in the
manual referred to in this act and further that the psychiatrist shall not be employed
on the staff of the institution where the patient is confined.
(k) The court shall order the defendants, as part of its order or decree, when it finds
that the patient has not received minimum treatment as defined in this act, to furnish
payment as specified in this act, for such treatment; and also to aid the patient in ar-
ranging for such treatment if the patient remains in the institution.
(1) Payments to psychiatrists so engaged shall be in accordance with regulations pro-
mulgated by the Department of Public Welfare and shall be reimbursable to the extent
of the patient's ability to pay, on the same basis as liability for reimbursement is deter-
mhined by law and regulation for mental institutional care generally.
(m) In the event that a patient who is entitled to petition a court for relief as speci-
fied in subsections (a) and (b) of section 8 of this act, shall be willing to accept treat-
ment on a private consulting basis, in lieu of petitioning a court for relief, the board
may, with the approval of the superintendent of the mental institution, certify to the de-
partment the medical eligibility of the patient to receive such treatment and the patient
shall thereafter have the right to have payment for such treatment furnished by the
Commonwealth, on the same basis and subject to the same requirements as specified in
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subsections (i) to (1) of section 8 of this act. In such event the superintendent of the
mental institution shall aid the patient in arranging for such treatment.
(n) In each case where payment is furnished by the department for patient treatment
on a private consulting basis, the superintendent of the mental institution where the
patient was confined shall have a review made every year of the patient's continued need
for treatment, unless the patient shall be discharged from treatment by his psychiatrist
before any annual review. In any such annual review the appropriate mental institution
staff and the patient's private psychiatrist shall jointly confer in determining the patient's
need for continued treatment.
(o) In case the patient's psychiatrist and the superintendent of the institution dis-
agree on the patient's further need for treatment, the mater shall be referred to the
Patient Treatment Review Board by the patient, or his private psychiatrist, or someone
on his behalf. Appeal shall be available from the findings of the Patient Treatment Re-
view Board as provided in clause (5), subsection (a) of section 8, as applicable.
Section 9. REpEALER.-All acts and parts of acts insofar as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
Section 10. SEVERABLrr.-If any provision of this act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held unconstitutional the remainder of the act and the
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
Section 11. APPROPRIATION.-The sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), or as
much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated to the Department of Public
Welfare for the fiscal year 1969-70 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this
act.
Section 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.-This act shall take effect January 1, 1970.
